seyed mohammad hosseini; Mohammad Yousefzade; Hosein Dabbagh
Abstract
Abstract
What does moral paternalism mean? What about moralism? How do moral paternalism and moralism differ? In paternalism, at least in its classical version, the aim is to prevent ...
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Abstract
What does moral paternalism mean? What about moralism? How do moral paternalism and moralism differ? In paternalism, at least in its classical version, the aim is to prevent people from inflicting harm on themselves, not necessarily on others. However, in moralism, the aim is to prevent people from committing what society regards as a wrongdoing to secure society’s understanding of morality. Some accounts of moralism argue that these wrongdoings ought to be criminalized. It is rather obvious to claim that applying moral paternalism and moralism shall restrict people’s liberty in one way or another. The question raised is that which one of these two approaches is plausible to be employed by states? In this paper, we argue that moralism restricts people’s liberty unjustifiably, hence implausible. We begin by accounting for and then we critically evaluate moralism. We conclude by arguing that moralism is not on the basis of a defendable approach.
Keywords: Paternalism, Moralism, “Morals, Conventional Morality, Legal Moralism
Introduction
Moralism and Paternalism are two systems of thought that deem to be against each other. Although there are some restrictions on "Individual Freedom" in both systems, its intensity and weakness will vary depending on which approach we adopt to justify it. In this paper, we explore these two systems to determine their justifiability in the restriction of freedom. Our main intention is to reject Moralism’s justification. However, this does not indicate that by rejecting Moralism, we defend its alternative simultaneously, e.g., Moral Paternalism.
What is essential in all forms of Paternalism, at least according to its classical approach, is not necessarily to harm others (the Harm Principle) - Paternalism should strive only to prevent someone from harming him/herself. But in Moralism, by interfering in citizens’ freedom, the aim is to avoid an "immoral" act; it is not about harm to self or others - what matters is that one commits an immoral act that society considers immoral. For Moralism, moral norms originate from society’s values, descriptively speaking.
Findings
In Paternalism, the restriction of individual freedom is justified only when one person’s action harms and endangers himself. So, an attempt should be made to prevent the person's risky action. But in the Moralism, as soon as an act occurs contrary to the common morals of society, whether this act causes harm to the person or others, individual freedom should be restricted and, according to some readings, we should even consider the act as a crime because of acting against the common moral codes.
What are the justifications for restricting individual freedom? One reason for interfering in the individuals’ freedom in Paternalism is that the individual should not be harmed - harm that, for example, can lead to death in some situations. Whereas in Moralism, the justification for interfering in the "freedom of the individual" is only because the action weakens the moral foundations of society - the conventional moral foundations that most people conform to. Thus, harming oneself and others does not work as a justification for moralists to interfere with freedom.
In Moral Paternalism, the main goal is to prevent one from putting him/herself in danger. This kind of Paternalism could be justifiable because the Paternalist, at least, has a prima facie reason to prevent moral harm to him/herself. In other forms of Paternalism, the Paternalist seeks to prevent the person from taking harmful action, not morally but in other practical respects. Moralism’s justification, however, seems not justified because it is based on the premise that one's moral harm is not necessarily the criterion for interfering in "individual liberty", but merely committing an act against the common conventional moral codes of society is wrong. This justification fails if one argues that these more codes are problematic and not normatively plausible.
In all forms of Moral Paternalism, individual freedoms’ restrictions must be justified. Still, the justification for restricting liberty in Paternalistic actions is based only on the fact that it threatens to harm a person. In Paternalism, although violating individual freedoms is morally wrong, when individuals are in danger and need of help, at least in such cases, violating their "freedom" is morally justifiable. The justification for restricting individual freedom in Paternalism is that the interventionist- or paternal action- is in the personal interest and society’s interest. Another reason for Paternalist action, according to some thinkers, is that a person should be helped in a situation where he does not have the power to protect himself and prevent himself from harm. Protecting someone's interests, protecting those who are unable to protect themselves, intervening in tools and instruments that put one at risk, or preventing one from consuming narcotics - albeit intermittent happiness but in the long run, endangers their self-determination and free will - these are issues that justify Paternalism and to prevent harm to oneself and violate individual liberty.
For example, a person who is mentally disabled, lacking in common sense, and engaging in risky action does not seem morally permissible to abandon. In Moralism, however, there is no valid reason to interfere with individual freedoms. Neither harming oneself is important to interfere with one's freedom, nor harming others - only that one has acted contrary to the customary morality of society deserves to be restricted in one person’s freedom. The Moralist philosophers are concerned with preserving the customs of society – customs maintained by moral codes, and any violation of these codes, even if private, is punishable. It is easy to imagine the extent to which individual freedoms are threatened and violated at any chance in this perception. Supposedly, to preserve the very existence of society, the government directs moral orders toward allegedly “immoral” actions and behavior’s that society finds immoral, such as homosexuals, different races, religious minorities, etc. Is it then possible to imagine security for such groups at all? The minimum virtue that will be lost to this group of people is "freedom". In Moralism, conventional morality is so important that it seems that the protection of the freedom of those who believe in these moral codes depends on the violation of the freedom of those who do not sympathize with this morality and do not obey its rules. Moralism is one of the strongest justifications for using criminal law to prohibit homosexual activities between satisfied adults in private.
Conclusion
Although both Paternalism and Moralism restrict the freedoms of individuals or citizens, as we have argued in this article, Moralists’ justification for citizens’ freedom is not plausible. The development of Moralism as a political theory can have counterintuitive consequences. Such theories will leave governments free to take what is intuitively morally unjustifiable as a means of maintaining power. For example, following Moralism, a government is justified in discriminating against a particular minority, e.g., the Uyghur Muslim minority in China- for the reason that their presence weakens the moral foundations of society. It is evident that such an argument is wrong and shows why Moralism is dubious.
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